Ethnic Diversity and Civil War by Tangerås, Thomas P. & Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter


















Working Paper No. 589, 2003 
 
Ethnic Diversity and Civil War 
 




















IUI, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 5501 
SE-114 85 Stockholm  
Sweden Ethnic Diversity and Civil War∗
Thomas P. Tangerås† and Nils-Petter Lagerlöf‡
October 14, 2002
Abstract
We construct a model in which a number of equally powerful ethnic
groups compete for power by engaging in civil war. In non-redistributive
equilibrium, ethnically homogeneous and ethnically diverse countries face
a lower probability of civil war than countries with a moderate degree of
ethnic diversity. The likelihood of conﬂict is maximized when there are two
ethnic groups. When rent-extraction possibilities are not too big and society
suﬃciently ethnically homogeneous, there also exists a paciﬁc equilibrium
path sustained by redistribution from the ruling group to the out-of-power
groups.
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Since 1960, 79 civil wars have erupted globally (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2000), some
of them ongoing still today. In addition to the human sacriﬁce and suﬀering caused
by these wars,1 they have had a devastating eﬀect on the economic performance of
the countries involved. Destruction of human and physical capital, infrastructure,
schooling and health services, dwindling tourism and foreign investment lead to an
average shrinkage in GDP of 0.05% p e ry e a ri nt h es u ﬀering countries (Collier and
Hoeﬄer, 2000, Table 2). Chad, a country of permanent tension and unrest ever
since state formation, had 1993 a 20% lower GDP per capita than when granted
independence in 1960, despite a substantial inﬂow of foreign aid during the later
years (Azam et.al, 1999). Armed conﬂict and war seem to be a fundamental
obstacle to growth and prosperity in many third-world countries.
This paper presents a theoretical study into the causes of civil war. The
starting point of our analysis is that many developing countries are organized
along ethnic or tribal lines, in particular in Africa. In the words of Azam (2001,
p.429): “Ethnic [aﬃliation] ensures to most African people the provision of many
services that a modern state has taken over in rich countries.” Power automatically
implies the control over foreign aid, economic rents from natural resources and
over public spending and investment, which allows the state leader to favourise
his own ethnic group or tribe at the expense of out-of-power groups. In Uganda
for example, the dictator Idi Amin and his successor Milton Obote indulged in
“massive favoritism to the beneﬁt of their minority ethnic group from the north,
1According to the standard deﬁnition (Singer and Small, 1982, 1994) a conﬂict qualiﬁes as
civil war if and only if it involves a number of battle deaths exceeding 1000 per year. Azam (2002)
presents estimates on 8 civil wars on the African continent in the period 1956-92 indicating that
the number of casualties, including civilian, exceeded 3 million.
2and to the detriment of the majority Baganda group” Azam (2001, p.430). Chad
during the sixties provides another example of a discriminating regime with most
public expenditure on schooling and infrastructure going to the south, mainly
populated by the ruling Saras, at the expense of the Toubos in the north, although
everybody paid the same tax (Azam et.al, 1999). This way of organizing society
creates a tension between the current ruler’s favoured group and the others. Add
to this a non-democratic governance structure, a common feature of conﬂict-ridden
countries, in which society is ruled by a king, emperor or president in a one-party
system, and the stage is set for armed conﬂict across ethnic lines over resources
and spending.2
The key question we address is: “in a society within which the ruling group
has the power to abuse other ethnic groups economically, how does the degree of
ethnic diversity (the number of ethnic groups) aﬀect the likelihood of civil war?”
To analyse this question, we build a model in which an exogenous number of
equally sized ethnic groups are involved in a dynamic conﬂi c tg a m ea g a i n s te a c h
other. At any given point in time one of the ethnic groups (the incumbent or
ruler) is in power, which enables it to enrichen itself at the expense of the other
groups (the outsiders). The only way for outsiders to challenge power is by means
of rebellion. A successful insurrection or defense implies the right to rule the
country the subsequent period. Failure implies being an outsider the subsequent
period.
2Political tension and exploitation does not necessarily imply conﬂict. Repressed groups must
be able to organize themselves into a ﬁghting group in order to rebel. For example, the urban
community has been systematically favoured by the government over the rural community in
a number of African countries. However, “in general, small farmers oﬀer little resistance to
governmental policies” (Azam et.al., 1999, p.22). The collective action problem constituted by
raising arms may explain why many observed conﬂicts are ethnic, in the ﬁrst place. It is perhaps
easier for ethnic groups to organize a military resistance than for peasants, owing to a common
history, language, culture and religion.
3The ethnically homogeneous society (a single ethnic group) is politically stable,
since there is no disagreement over the distribution of resources (this is true by
assumption). Increasing the number of ethnic groups may or may not create
instability, i.e. conﬂict. If the potential beneﬁto fh o l d i n go ﬃce is negligible
compared to the cost of conﬂict or if the future is discounted heavily, no outsider
w i l le v e rr e b e l . I nt h ec a s eo fapolitically unstable country, where the value of
holding oﬃce is high, increasing the degree of ethnic diversity (the number of
ethnic groups), has two countervailing eﬀects. Holding constant the probability
that each group rebels, increasing the number of ethnic groups leads to an increase
in the probability of civil war − a direct eﬀect. However, the expected amount of
resources invested in conﬂict increases with the number of ethnic groups, reducing
the probability of successful rebellion for each group. This makes insurrection a
less attractive policy option − a strategic eﬀect. It is shown that the strategic
eﬀect dominates whenever society consists of two or more ethnic groups. Taken
together, these results imply that the likelihood of civil war is maximized in a
country with two ethnic groups. This ﬁts well with the existing evidence: the risk
of civil war is relatively low both in societies with high and low degrees of ethnic
diversity. (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 1998, 2000, 2002; Collier, Hoeﬄer and Söderbom,
1999; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).3
Although all countries on the African continent are ethnically divided, only
a fraction of them have experienced civil war. This observation has lead Azam
(2001) to the conclusion that the core of the problem is a failure of the state to
reconcile diﬀerences, not ethnic diversity in itself. Our results lend support to this
3Lately this has also been put forward in more popular contexts, such as Amoako’s (1999)
address to the Organization of African Unity.
4view. We ﬁnd that paciﬁc equilibria sometimes co-exist with conﬂict equilibria. In
paciﬁc equilibrium the incumbent reduces tension by redistributing income to all
ethnic groups. However, paciﬁc equilibria are of a reputational nature, they will
prevail only if the ethnic groups expect the others to behave decently in the future.
In case of distrust there is no redistribution and maximization of short-term rent
only, with periods of conﬂict being the inevitable result. Paciﬁc equilibria exist if
and only if society is suﬃciently homogeneous (there are only a few ethnic groups)
and the value of holding oﬃce is suﬃciently low compared to the cost of conﬂict.
Otherwise there are too many groups that have to be paid oﬀ or the value of the
rent is so high that one ethnic group or the other will always have an incentive to
deviate from any tacit agreement to remain peaceful.
There is a large theoretical literature on conﬂict and appropriation, starting
with Hirschleifer (1988, 1989, 1995), Grossman (1991) and Skaperdas (1991, 1992).
Our approach diﬀers from these papers in at least one of the three following
respects: (i) we allow for more than two groups;4 (ii) the decision to engage in
conﬂict is endogenous,5 and (iii)w eu s eadynamic setting, which allows us to
study the circumstances under which self-enforcing redistribution can be used to
reduce the threat of conﬂict.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 derives the main results, ﬁrst assuming no transfers, and then allowing
for transfers. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
4This complicates the analysis, but is necessary for our purpose of analyzing the eﬀects of
changing the number of ethnic groups. Neary (1997) and Hirschleifer (1995) also allow for the
number of players to vary.
5In the standard conﬂict model it is costly to invest in arms, but having undertaken that
investment there is no cost of engaging in conﬂict. Thus (at least in the most common inter-
pretation), this is a setting which predicts perpetual conﬂict. Our model can predict war with
probability less than one. See also Neary (1996) and Grossman and Kim (1995).
6Azam (1995) considers a two-group model with exogenous enforcement of transfers.
52. The Model
We consider a dynamic game between N +1identical ethnic groups. In any given
period one of them is in power, the incumbent or ruler.T h eN ≥ 1 other groups





Transfer Conﬂict Change of
power
At the beginning of each period the incumbent receives an initial endowment
θ, the rent from holding power. It stems from such things as controlling foreign
aid distribution and the rents from natural resources like oil ﬁelds and diamond
mines. The incumbent may or may not choose to share parts of θ with the other
ethnic groups. If the ruler chooses to do so, an equal amount x ≥ 0 is transferred
to each outsider group at total cost Nx ≤ θ to the ruler. Considering that
ethnic groups often are geographically segregated,7 one can think of redistribution
as regional expenditures on infrastructure, health and schooling ﬁnanced by the
central government.
This is not a democracy: no outsider has any direct saying in the amount
x to be distributed. The only way to challenge power is by force. We model
this by assuming that outsiders in every period decide simultaneously and non-
7Chad, for example, is inhabited by the Toubos in the north, black Arabs and Fulanis in the
middle and the Saras in the south (Azam et.al, 1999).
6cooperatively whether to rebel.8 The decision to rebel is taken after that period’s
transfer x has been distributed (and consumed). Each belligerent group (including
the incumbent, who cannot choose whether to ﬁght or not) incurs disutility K.
K includes the alternative cost of military expenditures, the human sacriﬁce and
so forth associated with war. Finally, the change of power, if any, takes place. All
decision-makers are assumed risk-neutral.
What determines the probability of winning a conﬂict? For the incumbent,
this is relatively straightforward. The more ethnic groups that are involved in a
rebellion, the more resources are invested into the conﬂict and the more diﬃcult
it becomes to survive. Hence, one would expect the likelihood of the incumbent’s
survival to be decreasing in the number of groups involved in rebellion. Things
are more complicated for the outsiders. The more other outsiders are involved,
the easier it probably becomes to ﬁght the incumbent since he has to divide
his resources to ﬁg h tm o r ec h a l l e n g e r s . H o w e v e r ,i td o e sn o ts u ﬃce to beat the
incumbent to become the ruler, a challenger must even beat the other ﬁghting
groups. It is not clear how all of this should be resolved, but we make the standard
assumption that any belligerent group’s likelihood of winning a conﬂict depends
on the amount of resources invested by that group relative to the amount invested
by all rebel groups. All groups are identical, hence it is not unnatural to assume
that they invest equally much in conﬂict. Suppose an outsider has decided to
engage in conﬂict, and there are M other outsiders who have made the same
decision. In this case the relative amount of resources invested by each ethnic
8Under the simultaneity assumption we avoid assigning arbitrary ﬁrst-mover or second-mover
advantages to groups. When it comes to the assumption that groups move non-cooperatively,
this seems at odds with the casual observation that ethnic groups from time to time manage to
form coalitions in a rebellion against the sitting government. However, such coalitions tend to
break down after a while. Hence, coalitions do not appear to be stable in the long run. Our
assumption is that coalitions are unstable even in the short run.
7group is 1/(M +2 ) , which then is the probability of winning the conﬂict.9 The
more groups are involved, the lower is the likelihood that each wins. The number
of belligerents is stochastic. An outsider does not know at the time of rebellion
how many challengers he is going to face. Since outsiders take the decision non-
cooperatively and simultaneously and all are equally likely to participate, the
number of belligerents is binomially distributed. Thus, the probability of facing
M other outsiders for an ethnic group that has decided to rebel is:
b(q,M,N − 1) =
(N − 1)!qM(1 − q)N−1−M
M!(N − 1 − M)!
, (2.1)
with q the probability of rebellion and N −1 the total number of other outsiders.




(N − 1)!qM(1 − q)N−1−M




This expression is diﬃcult to work with. However (the proof is in appendix A.1):
Lemma 2.1.
p(q,N)=
(N +1 ) q − (1 − (1 − q)N+1)
(N +1 ) Nq2 . (2.3)
p(q,N) has the following properties (subscripts denote partial derivatives through-
out): (i) p(q,1) = 1/2;( ii) p(1,N)=1 /(N +1 ) ;( iii) p(0,N)=1 /2;( iv)
pq(q,N) < 0 for N>1 and q>0;( v) pN(q,N) < 0 for q>0.
These results make intuitive sense: if all N +1groups partake in the conﬂict
with certainty (q =1 ), each has probability 1/(N +1 )of winning. Similarly, if
9This corresponds to Tullock’s (1980) Contest Power Function.
8only one outsider partakes (q =0or N =1 ), p =1 /2, i.e., the ruler and the sole
participating outsider each wins the conﬂict with equal probability. The compar-
ative statics results are equally intuitive: the higher is the perceived probability
that the other outsiders engage in conﬂict (the higher is q) or the more ethnic
groups might potentially participate (the higher is N), the more resources are on
average deployed into conﬂict and the lower is the expected probability of winning
for each of the belligerents.
Whenever the players have a decision to make, the action they choose is a
function of the game’s history: the ruler determines the size of the transfer and
outsiders randomize between rebelling and remaining peaceful. The history is
the vector of choices all ethnic groups have made in the past. A player’s strat-
egy is a plan that to every period assigns which action to take as a function of
every conceivable history. The equilibrium concept applied is that of Subgame-
Perfection. A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a vector of strategies, one
strategy for each player, that has the following property: at no point in time and
for no history can any player proﬁtably deviate from the action prescribed by the
equilibrium strategy, given that the player expects (i) all other players to play
their equilibrium strategies today and (ii) all players, including herself, to play
the equilibrium strategy in the future. In order to keep the analysis tractable,
we restrict our attention to symmetric and time-invariant equilibria; the amount
of redistribution is constant, and all outsiders rebel with the same probability at
every point in time along the equilibrium path.
93. Equilibrium analysis
Consider ﬁrst the expected value V O of being an outsider along a symmetric and
time-invariant equilibrium path:
V
O = x +( 1− q)δV
O + q[pδV
I +( 1− p)δV
O − K]. (3.1)
First, the outsider consumes the equilibrium transfer x this period. Subsequently
the group stays peaceful with probability 1−q and rebels with probability q.I nt h e
ﬁrst event, the group remains an outsider even the next period, which has value
V O discounted by δ ∈ (0,1).I n c a s e o f c o n ﬂict, the belligerent incurs disutility
K with certainty, expects to win and gain power with probability p = p(q,N),
the discounted value of which being δV I,a n dt ol o s ea n dr e m a i na no u t s i d e rw i t h
probability (1 − p), the discounted value of which being δV O.
The value V I of being an incumbent along the same equilibrium path is
V
I = θ − Nx+ zδV
I +( 1− z)[pδV
I +( 1− p)δV
O − K]. (3.2)
The ruler keeps θ − Nx for himself and his group and distributes the rest of the
rent to the outsiders. Subsequently peace prevails with probability z =( 1− q)N.
In this case the incumbent remains in power even the next period, which has
discounted value δV I. War breaks out with probability 1 − z, the incumbent
group is ousted to become an outsider with probability 1 − p and remains in
power with probability p, the discounted value being δV O respective δV I in the
two cases. The disutility K of war is incurred with certainty.
(3.1) and (3.2) constitute two linear equations in two unknowns V O and V I.
10They can be solved in order to explicitly obtain the equilibrium value functions:
V
O(q,x)=
δpq(θ − Nx)+( 1− δ(z +( 1− z)p))x − q(1 − δz)K




(1 − δ(1 − pq))(θ − Nx)+( 1− z)(δ((1 − p)x +( 1− q)K) − K)
(1 − δ)(1 − δ(p(1 − q)+( 1− p)z))
.
(3.4)
3.1. Equilibrium without redistribution
This section describes and analyses the equilibrium of the conﬂi c tg a m ef o rw h i c h
the incumbent group keeps the entire rent for itself, i.e. x =0 .L e t qnr be
the equilibrium probability of rebellion by each group (this is shown below to be
unique) in non-redistributive equilibrium. Write V Inr = V I(qnr,0) and V Onr =
V O(qnr,0) the two equilibrium value functions. Denote by znr =( 1− qnr)N the
equilibrium probability of peace and by pnr = p(qnr,N) the equilibrium expected
probability of winning a conﬂict.
Consider ﬁrst the incumbent’s incentives for transferring rents to out-of-power
groups. Suppose the outsiders are believed to be unresponsive to transfers, i.e.
q(x)=qnr for all x ∈ [0,θ/N].T h ev a l u eb V I(x) of making a transfer x to each
outsider is then given by:
b V
I(x)=θ − Nx+ z
nrδV
Inr +( 1− z
nr)[p
nrδV
Inr +( 1− p
nr)δV
Onr − K].




If the incumbent believes that he cannot aﬀect the outsiders’ actions, there is no
point in redistributing anything to the other groups. Consider next an outsider’s
11incentives. Suppose each outsider believes all other outsiders to be unresponsive





Inr +( 1− p
nr)δV
Onr − K]+( 1− γ)δV
Onr.







The ﬁrst term is the marginal beneﬁto fc o n ﬂict. It is the discounted value of
the diﬀerence between ruling and being an outsider the subsequent period times
the probability of winning the conﬂict. From this is to be subtracted the cost K
of rebellion. Observe that the optimal choice of γ is independent of x under the
current set of beliefs, hence q(x)=qnr for all x ∈ [0,θ/N] constitutes a consistent
set of beliefs.
Set x =0and q = qnr in (3.3) and (3.4), substitute into the expression above




δpnrθ − (1 − δznr)K
1 − δ[pnr(1 − qnr)+( 1− pnr)znr]
. (3.5)
The denominator is positive for all values of q, hence the sign of the marginal
incentive for engaging in conﬂict depends entirely on the sign of the numerator
of (3.5). By the properties of p(·,N), the numerator is decreasing in q.T h e
more likely rebellion by other groups in this and future periods is perceived to
be, the more resources are expected to be invested into conﬂict. Consequently,
the expected likelihood of becoming the ruler and being able to maintain that
position is decreasing in q. This makes insurrection a less attractive policy option
12for each ethnic group the higher is the estimated likelihood that the other groups
will rebel. Decisions are strategic substitutes.N o t ea l s ot h a ti ft h ev a l u eo fh o l d -
ing oﬃce is small [large] compared to the cost of conﬂict (θ/K is small [large]),
rebellion becomes relatively less [more] appealing. Furthermore, if outsiders are
very impatient (δ is small) conﬂict will never occur since the cost of conﬂict is
realized today and the beneﬁts in the future. In sum (the proof is in appendix
A.2):
Proposition 3.1. In symmetric and time-invariant SPE without redistribution:
(i) there is perpetual peace (qnr =0 ) if the period beneﬁt of holding oﬃce is
small compared to the period cost of engaging in war or if outsiders discount the
future heavily (δθ ≤ 2(1 − δ)K); (ii) there is perpetual civil war (qnr =1 )i ft h e
discounted period value of holding oﬃce outweighs the maximal period disutility
of war (δθ ≥ (N+1)K); (iii) each outsider goes to war with probability qnr ∈ (0,1)
implicitly given by (3.6) otherwise.10
δp(q
nr,N)θ =( 1− δ(1 − q
nr)
N)K (3.6)
Having characterized the potential equilibria of the game, we move on to the
main purpose of this section: to study how the likelihood of conﬂict varies with
the number of ethnic groups. The equilibrium probability of civil war in any given
period is:
10Strategies are functions of all the possible histories of the game, even oﬀ the equilibrium
path. There are inﬁnitely many action proﬁles that sustain x =0and qnr as the equilibrium
probability of conﬂict, hence there are inﬁnitely many SPE. However, qnr is uniquely deﬁned
by the properties of p, hence there is a unique symmetric and time-invariant equilibrium path
in the non-redistributive case. If we restrict attention to SPE in strategies that are allowed to
depend on pay-oﬀ relevant state variables only, so-called Markov-Perfect Equilibria (MPE), the
SPE with x =0and probablity qnr of rebellion is the unique symmetric MPE.
13y
nr =1− (1 − q
nr)
N. (3.7)
If the incumbent’s ability to extract rent is small (δθ ≤ 2(1 − δ)K), there is
never conﬂict - irrespective of the number of ethnic groups (part (i)o fp r o p o s i t i o n
3.1). The country is politically stable. Below we consider the more interesting
case of a politically unstable country. This is a country for which rent extraction
possibilities are so big (δθ > 2(1−δ)K) that insurrections occur regularly (qnr > 0
from parts (ii)a n d( iii) of proposition 3.1). To see how the likelihood of conﬂict
in an unstable country depends on the number of ethnic groups, diﬀerentiate ynr










In an interior equilibrium an increase in the number of ethnic groups has two
eﬀects. Holding ﬁxed the probability that each group rebels, increasing the num-
ber of ethnic groups leads to an increase in the probability of civil war. This
direct eﬀect is captured by the ﬁrst term in (3.8). However, increasing the num-
ber of ethnic groups aﬀects each group’s incentive for starting conﬂict since the
probability of winning changes. This strategic eﬀect is captured by the second
term.
In general, one would expect the rent to holding oﬃce and the disutility of






N θ + znrK ln(1 − qnr)+K d
dN[ θ
K]
N(1 − qnr)N−1K − pnr
q θ
. (3.9)
The sign of the strategic eﬀect is ambiguous in general. For constant population
size, an increased number of ethnic groups implies smaller-sized groups and thus
14larger gain of holding oﬃce. Hence, θ
0(N) > 0 seems likely. The expected outcome
of conﬂict for an ethnic group is a function of the eﬀort and resources deployed
into winning by each individual belonging to that group. Since a signiﬁcant share
of the cost of warfare is carried by individuals, whereas the proceeds of victory
are spread between all group members, the individual only internalizes a fraction
of his own contribution, hence contributes to little from the group’s point of view.
As is well known (see e.g. Olson, 1965), the severity of this collective action
problem tends to increase in group size. Thus, K0(N) > 0 seems realistic too.
Depending on the relative magnitude of the rent and cost eﬀects, the strategic
eﬀect can be negative or positive. We have no a priori views on how θ/K would
be expected to vary as a function of N. In order to avoid biasing our results in




K(N)]=0 .11 Under this assumption, the strategic eﬀect becomes
unambiguously negative.
Varying the number of ethnic groups in this model is like varying the number
of ﬁrms under Cournot competition. Increasing the number of ﬁrms has a direct
eﬀect for given ﬁrm output: lowering prices through increased supply. However,
there is a strategic eﬀect working in the opposite direction: ﬁrms reduce output
as a response to increased competition. It is well known that the eﬀect of entry on
prices in Cournot equilibrium is ambiguous in general.12 In this model, however,
the strategic eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect (the proof is in appendix A.3):
Proposition 3.2. In the politically unstable country without redistribution, the
11If I is total population size and rent θ is evenly distributed across the group members,
θ(N)=θN/I.I fK(N)=KN/I,w eh a v eθ(N)/K(N)=θ/K. More generally, all our results




12See Amir and Lambson (2000) for a state-of-the-art analysis.
15probability of conﬂict is decreasing in the degree of ethnic diversity along the sym-
metric, time-invariant equilibrium path. The likelihood of conﬂict is maximized
when there are 2 ethnic groups.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings by Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998), namely that
the likelihood of civil war is the smallest in very homogeneous or heterogeneous
societies.13 Their regressions predict that, holding other explanatory variables
constant at their sample means, the probability of civil war reaches a maximum
at a degree of ethnic diversity that corresponds to approximately two equally
strong ethnic groups.
For the other parameters of the model, aggregate behaviour is captured by












δ[N(1 − qnr)N−1K − pnr
q θ]
> 0.
It immediately follows from this and from dynr = N(1 − qnr)N−1dqnr that:
Proposition 3.3. In the politically unstable country without redistribution, the
probability of conﬂict is increasing in the rent of holding oﬃce θ,d e c r e a s i n gi n
t h ec o s to fc o n ﬂict K and increasing in the discount rate δ along the symmetric,
time-invariant equilibrium path.
The intuition is straightforward: a higher θ/K m a k e si tm o r ea t t r a c t i v et o
become a ruler relative to the cost of conﬂict, which induces outsiders to rebel. So
13By assumption there is no potential for intra-group conﬂict in our model. Hence, a perfectly
homogeneous society (N =0 ) would trivially be paciﬁc.
16does a high δ, since it implies that the future pay-oﬀs to insurrections are given a
high weight.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) identify wealth as a signiﬁcant determinant of con-
ﬂict. The wealthier are countries, the lower is the likelihood of civil war. This
analysis invites a more nuanced view. It is not per capita wealth that matters,
but rather the distribution of it. A country can be rich and conﬂict-ridden if
wealth is distributed unequally (high θ but no redistribution) or poor and stable
if wealth is distributed equally across ethnic groups (this becomes more evident
in the next section). This interpretation is in line with Azam et.al. (1999: p.19)
who list ”[g]reat inequality in resource distribution among ethnic groups...” and
”[g]reat inequality in the distribution of public expenditure and of taxation...”
among their factors of conﬂict.
3.2. Equilibrium with redistribution
Conﬂict leads to costly waste of resources by all involved parties. Clearly, all ethnic
groups can be made better oﬀ if the incumbent can somehow compensate the
outsider groups for remaining peaceful. The problem is that the incumbent cannot
commit to redistribution and outsiders cannot commit not to engage in conﬂict.
Contracts between the government and the outsiders are not enforceable by court,
they must be self-enforcing. Somehow, the outsiders must ﬁnd a way to punish the
ruler for failing to meet his obligations and there must be a mechanism by which
outsiders are kept in line. The way we think of it here, opportunistic behaviour
either by the ruler or some of the outsiders throws the country into turmoil: the
outsiders return to a strategy of non-cooperation (the equilibrium analysed in the
previous section). Let a Paciﬁc Transfer Equilibrium (PTE) refer to an SPE in
17which civil war does not break out in equilibrium and where deviations from the
equilibrium path are punished by reversion to the non-redistributive equilibrium
derived in the previous section.14 This section derives the circumstances under
which redistribution can be used to uphold peace and speciﬁcally analyses the
eﬀect of ethnic diversity on the existence of PTE. Logically, we conﬁne the analysis
to the case of a politically unstable country.
Suppose the incumbent makes a period transfer xr to each outsider. If all
outsiders stay peaceful, each group receives xr with certainty in every period from
now on to eternity. The value V Or to an outsider of staying peaceful in such an








If the ruler wants to stay in power with certainty, the outsiders must prefer peace








Onr] − K]+( 1− γ)δV
Or.
By attacking, the outsider group surrenders K, but wins the conﬂict with proba-
bility 1/2 since it only has to ﬁght the incumbent. In the next period cooperation
breaks down, and the game reverts back to the non-cooperative state analysed in
the previous section. If the outsider group remains peaceful, on the other hand, it
gets utility δV Or. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the outsider to prefer
14This begs the question of how much cooperation can be achieved, i.e. whether optimal
punishments exist. The model considered here is dynamic in the sense that each player’s action
set is history-dependent. Speciﬁcally, the action set depends on whether the player is a ruler or
outsider. This means that the results obtained by Abreu (1986) and others cannot be utilised
since they apply to inﬁnitely repeated games. At this stage we have not been able to verify that










Onr] − [K + δV
Or] ≤ 0.
Given (3.10), this equation shows that there exists a lower bound x on transfers
required by the outsider in order to be willing to stay peaceful.
How much is the incumbent willing pay for peace? The incumbent has period








along the paciﬁc equilibrium path. Consider the expected value b V I(x) to the ruler
of deviating from cooperative play and paying the rent x instead:
b V
I(x)=θ − Nx+ z
nrδV
Inr +( 1− z
nr)[p
nrδV
Inr +( 1− p
nr)δV
Onr − K].
Since cooperation breaks down for any deviation from xr, the incumbent opti-
mally sets x =0conditional on deviating. A deviation is unproﬁtable if and
only if V Ir ≥ b V I(0) = V Inr. This creates an upper bound x on the amount of
redistribution in which the incumbent is willing to indulge, in order to preserve
peace. Any xr ∈ [x,x] is suﬃciently large to keep outsiders in line and constitutes
as u ﬃciently small price for the incumbent to pay for peace. Civil war breaks out
for any transfer outside this region, either because the incumbent chooses to grab
the instantaneous rent or because power is challenged by one or more outsiders.
Obviously, PTE exist if and only if x ≥ x.
Regarding existence of paciﬁc equilibria, consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of the rent
to holding oﬃce versus the disutility of warfare. From proposition 3.3 we know
that the higher is the rent relative to the cost of conﬂi c t ,t h em o r ef a v o u r a b l e
it becomes to control the resource allocation and the higher is the likelihood of
19conﬂict, all other things equal. On the other hand, a high rent also leaves the
incumbent a lot of room for redistribution. Owing to the fact that the incumbent
pockets some of the increased rent for himself, there exists a point at which the
rent of oﬃce becomes so high that peace cannot be sustained in equilibrium (the
proof is in appendix A.4):
Proposition 3.4. When the period value θ of holding oﬃce is suﬃciently large
relative to the disutility K of conﬂict ( θ
K >
2(1+δ)
δ(1−δ)), there exists no PTE.
Clearly then, for a PTE to exist, it is necessary that rent not be too high.
Consider next what happens as the number of ethnic groups changes. As N
increases, the incumbent is forced to bribe more and more groups in order to
maintain peace.15 Also the probability of insurrection is decreasing in N.D e -
viating becomes an increasingly attractive policy option for the incumbent as N
increases since the punishment threat becomes weaker and weaker and the cost
savings larger and larger. Consider next the incentives of an outsider. A belliger-
ent outsider wins the subsequent conﬂict with probability 1/2 irrespective of the
number of outsiders, since the only other party involved in conﬂict is the incum-
bent. Once the conﬂict is won, the new ruler is unlikely to be replaced if there is a
lot of ethnic diversity, since the probability of subsequent war is low. Hence, each
outsider must receive a large period transfer in order to remain peaceful when the
number of ethnic groups is large. In sum, the transfer demands of the outsiders
15Holding constant the amount x transferred to each group, per capita transfer increases as
the number of ethnic groups increases, all other things held equal. That is, per capita transfer is
xN/I,w h e r eI is total population size. This would tend to push down the transfer demands of
each individual group. Under the assumption that disutility of conﬂict increases proportionally
in N,i . e . K(N)=KN/I and that economic rent θ is evenly distributed across the ruling
group, i.e. θ(N)=θN/I under the non-redistributive equilibrium, this moderating eﬀect of N
on transfer demands vanishes.
20and the ruler’s willingness to pay are incompatible for N suﬃciently high (the
proof is in appendix A.5):
Proposition 3.5. In the politically unstable country for which the period value
of holding oﬃc ei sn o tt o ol a r g e( θ/K <
2(1+δ)
δ(1−δ)), there exists an N>1 such that
a PTE exists if and only if N ≤ N.16
The proposition states that paciﬁc equilibria exist only in countries for which
t h er e n tt oh o l d i n go ﬃce does not overshadow the cost of warfare and where, at
the same time, the degree of ethnic diversity is not too large. If this is not the
case, either the beneﬁto fh o l d i n go ﬃce is too large or there are too many groups
t ob r i b et ob ea b l et or e a c hap a c i ﬁc equilibrium. By combining parts (ii)a n d
(iii) of proposition 3.1 with proposition 3.5 we prove the existence of multiple
equilibria and hence provide an example of the policy failure alluded to by Azam
(2001).
Corollary 3.1. In politically unstable societies with limited degree of ethnic di-
versity (N ∈ [1,N]) and with limited possibilities for rent-extraction (θ/K <
2(1+δ)
δ(1−δ)), there exists, in addition conﬂict equilibria without redistribution, peace-
ful equilibria with redistribution.
In relatively homogeneous countries the ruler sometimes has both the possibil-
ity and the incentive for using transfers to avoid civil war. This does not mean that
peace will necessarily prevail. Peace can be accomplished only if the groups out of
power expect the ruler to honour his agreement and redistribute wealth in their
favour, and the ruler expects groups to remain peaceful. A country may equally
16In the knife-edge case θ/K =
2(1+δ)
δ(1−δ) there exists a PTE if and only if N =1 .
21well be caught up in an equilibrium of distrust and conﬂict for which outsiders
rebel in order to gain inﬂuence, and the insider takes full advantage of being in
power by enriching himself and his peers. Hence, two societies identical in terms
of ethnic diversity and wealth may have experienced totally diﬀerent histories of
conﬂict - one being stable, with political participation and redistribution from
the state to all ethnic groups, the other characterized by systematic favourisation
of the ethnic group of the current ruler, with political instability and frequent
uprisings as a result.
T h eI v o r yC o a s tp r o v i d e sas t r i k i n ge x a m p l eo ft h eP a c i ﬁc Transfer Equilib-
rium. According to Azam (1995) two features were instrumental in maintaining
peace during the long reign of the late Houpouët-Boigny, president from indepen-
dence in 1961 until his death in 1993: shared political power with his political
opponents and heavy redistribution from rich ethnic groups, including his own, to
poorer regions. In contrast, neighbours Liberia and Burkina Faso, with which the
Ivory Coast shares major ethnic groups, were politically unstable during the same
period, experiencing frequent coups d’etat and sometimes civil war. The case of
Uganda (Azam, 1995) provides anecdotal evidence on the existence of multiple
equilibria. Uganda remained essentially peaceful under the regime of Museveni
who included in his government representatives from other ethnic groups. How-
ever, under his predecessor Obote, who favoured his own ethnic group and its
close allies, “Uganda witnesses one of the worst slaughters ever...” (Azam, 1995:
175).
224. Conclusion
This paper has studied the determinants of civil war. We have focused on ethnic
conﬂicts to see if we can ﬁnd an explanation to what seems to be an empirical
regularity (Collier and Hoeﬄer 1998, 2000, 2002; Collier, Hoeﬄer and Söderbom
1999; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000): countries with moderate ethnic diversity
seem to be most at risk of civil war, whereas more homogeneous and more eth-
nically diverse societies both face lower risks. We have constructed a model with
an exogenous number of ethnic groups who play a dynamic conﬂi c tg a m ea g a i n s t
e a c ho t h e r .A ta n yg i v e np o i n ti nt i m eo n eo ft h ee t h n i cg r o u p s( t h ei n c u m b e n t )
is in power, which enables it to enrichen itself at the expense of the other groups
(the outsiders). The only way for outsiders to challenge power is by means of
insurrection.
In an ethnically homogeneous society (a single ethnic group) there is never
conﬂict since there is no disagreement over the distribution of resources (this is true
by assumption). Increasing the degree of ethnic diversity (the number of ethnic
groups), has two countervailing eﬀects. Holding ﬁxed the probability that each
group rebels, increasing the number of ethnic groups leads to an increase in the
probability of civil war − a direct eﬀect. However, competition for power increases
with the number of ethnic groups, which makes insurrection a less attractive policy
option for each separate group − a strategic eﬀect. We show that the strategic
eﬀect dominates whenever society consists of two or more ethnic groups. Taken
together, these results imply that the likelihood of civil war is maximized in a
society with two ethnic groups. Further, the likelihood of civil war is increasing
in period rent of holding power and in the discount rate and decreasing in the
23disutility of war.
There exist multiple equilibria in societies that are not too ethnically diverse
and where the rent-extraction possibilities are not too big. In addition to non-
cooperative, conﬂict equilibria there exits a continuum of equilibria in which the
ruler distributes income to all outsiders to keep them paciﬁc. The existence of
multiple equilibria has implications for empirical testing of the relationship be-
tween civil war and ethnic diversity: what we can expect to observe empirically
should depend on which equilibrium we believe is more likely to occur. Since
paciﬁc equilibria are associated with redistributive policies from the ruling eth-
nic group to the outsiders (which could have eﬀects on growth and development
in other frameworks), our model might lend insights to an expanding empirical
literature on the relationship between ethnic fractionalisation, policies, political
institutions, and growth (See Mauro, 1995; Lian and Oneal, 1997; Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Annett, 2000; Easterly 2000).
Does the model provide any insights into how the danger of civil war can be
reduced in ethnically diverse countries? Given that borders can only occasionally
be redrawn to create ethnically homogenous societies, the solution seems to be
either to increase the cost of warfare or aﬀect governmental redistribution possi-
bilities. Many of the world’s most conﬂict-ridden countries are major recipients
of foreign aid. This provides a tool for the international community to inﬂuence
domestic policies. Investments in infrastructure, health and education tailored
directly to the various ethnic groups in a country increases their wealth and si-
multaneously the cost of warfare. Moreover, it reduces rent-extraction possibilities
by channelling foreign aid outside the central government directly to the recipi-
ents. Finally, democratization would lead to an increase in political participation
24by ethnic minorities and probably to a composition of government that approxi-
mates the ethnic composition of society. This would reduce tension between ethnic
g r o u p sa n dl e a dt oaf a i r e rd i s t r i b u t i o no fr e s o u r c e s ,w h i c hi nt u r nm i g h tr e d u c e
the risk of war.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of lemma 2.1




(M +1 ) ( N − 1)!qM(1 − q)N−1−M
(M +2 ) ! ( N − 1 − M)!
.( A . 1 )
Deﬁne the new variables S = M +2and B = N +1and perform a change of
variables on (A.1):
p(q,B − 1) =
B X
S=2















The second equality follows from multiplying and dividing through by B(B−1)q2
in p(q,B − 1) and the third equality from the deﬁnition of b(q,·,·), see equation
27(2.1). Note that b(q,1,B)(1 − 1) = 0 and b(q,0,B)(0 − 1) = −(1 − q)B.T h u s :
p(q,B − 1) =
1













by the properties of the binomial distribution, we get:
p(q,B − 1) =
Bq − [1 − (1 − q)B]
B(B − 1)q2 .
Substitute B = N +1into this expression to obtain (2.3).
Properties (i)a n d( ii) follow directly from inserting respectively N =1and
q =1into (2.3) and simplifying.















where we have applied L’Hôpital’s rule twice.
Property (iv):
pq(q,N)=
2[1 − (1 − q)N+1] − (N + 1)[1 + (1 − q)N]q
(N +1 ) Nq3 .( A . 2 )
The denominator is positive for q>0, hence the sign of pq(q,N) depends on the
sign of the numerator, which we deﬁne as A(q). A has the following properties:
A
0(q)=( N +1 ) [ N(1 − q)
N−1q +( 1− q)
N − 1] (A.3)
A
00(q)=−(N +1 ) N(N − 1)(1 − q)
N−2q (A.4)
Since A00(q) < 0 for N>1 and q ∈ (0,1),a n dA0(0) = 0, A(q) is maximized at
q =0 . A(0) = 0, hence A(q) < 0 for all q>0, which establishes the result.
Property (v): Diﬀerentiate to obtain:
pN(q,N)=
2N +1− (N +1 ) 2q − [2N +1− (N +1 ) N ln(1 − q)](1 − q)N+1
(N +1 ) 2N2q2 .
28pN(q,N) is negative if the numerator is negative, since the denominator is positive
for q>0.D e ﬁne the numerator as B(q).N o t et h a t :
B
0(q)=( N +1 )
2[(1 − N ln(1 − q))(1 − q)
N − 1] (A.5)
B
00(q)=( N +1 )
2N
2 ln(1 − q)(1 − q)
N−1 (A.6)
B00(q) < 0 for all q ∈ (0,1),w h i c hi m p l i e sB(q) < 0 for all q>0 by B0(0) = 0 and
B(0) = 0.
A.2. Proof of proposition 3.1
Deﬁne the function
H(s,N)=δp(s,N)θ − (1 − δ(1 − s)
N)K.( A . 7 )
By deﬁnition, the numerator of (3.5) is equal to H(qnr,N). If it is positive (nega-
tive), the outsider will rebel (remain peaceful) for sure, if it is zero he is indiﬀerent
between war and peace. By the properties of p(·,N) (see lemma 2.1), it is straight-
forward to verify that Hs < 0 for all s ∈ [0,1].
Suppose H(0,N) ≤ 0 or equivalently (recalling from lemma 2.1 that p(0,N)=
1/2):
δθ ≤ 2(1 − δ)K.
In this case the net beneﬁto fc o n ﬂict is always non-positive and strictly negative
so long as the outsider expects the other groups to rebel with positive probability
(q>0). No outsider can ever beneﬁt from rebellion. This means that the unique
symmetric and time-invariant equilibrium without redistribution in this case is
that all groups remain peaceful.
Consider next the case with H(1,N) ≥ 0 or equivalently (recalling from lemma
2.1 that p(1,N)=1 /(N +1 ) ):
δθ ≥ (N +1 ) K.
Now the opposite holds. The net beneﬁto fc o n ﬂict is always non-negative and
strictly positive whenever the other outsiders remain peaceful with positive prob-
ability (q<1). No outsider can ever beneﬁt from staying peaceful. There is
perpetual civil war along the symmetric and time-invariant equilibrium path.
I nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a s e2(1 − δ)K<δθ < (N +1 ) K,w a rm a yo rm a yn o t
break out in equilibrium. H(0,N) > 0, H(1,N) < 0 and Hs(s,N) < 0 yield a
unique qnr ∈ (0,1) given by (3.6) such that H(qnr,N)=0 . q>[<]qnr cannot
be a symmetric equilibrium since each ﬁrm individually would prefer to remain
peaceful (set γ =0 ) [rebel (set γ =1 )] in that case. Hence, the unique symmetric
and time-invariant mixed strategy equilibrium is the solution to (3.6).
29A.3. Proof of proposition 3.2
We ﬁrst prove an intermediate result:
Lemma A.1. dynr/d N<0 for all qnr ∈ (0,1).
Proof. Substitute (3.9) into (3.8), recalling the assumption d
dN[ θ
K]=0 ,a n d





(1 − q)ln(1− q)pq(q,N)+NpN(q,N)
N(1 − q)N−1K − pq(q,N)θ
θ(1 − q)
N−1.
In the notation of the previous proof, pq(q,N)=A(q)/ (N+1)Nq3 and pN(q,N)=




(N +1 ) A(q)(1 − q)ln(1− q)+B(q)q
(N +1 ) Nq3[N(1 − q)N−1K − pq(q,N)θ]
θ(1 − q)
N−1.
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of the numerator of the fraction
since the denominator and the second term are both positive for q ∈ (0,1).D e ﬁne
the function C(s):
C(s)=( N +1 ) A(s)(1 − s)ln(1− s)+B(s)s.
By deﬁnition, dy/dN < 0 ⇐⇒ C(q) < 0. C(·) has the following properties:
C
0(s)=( N +1 ) [ A




00(s)=[ ( N +1 ) A
00(s)(1 − s)ln(1− s)+B
00(s)s] (A.8)
+2[B
0(s) − (N +1 ) A
0(s)]
−2(N +1 ) A
0(s)ln(1− s)+
(N +1 ) A(s)
1 − s
.
By substituting (A.4) for A00(·) and (A.6) for B00(·) in the ﬁrst line of (A.8) and
(A.5) for B0(·) and (A.3) for A0(·) in the second line of (A.8), one obtains (after
simpliﬁcation):
C




2N[s +( 1− s)ln(1− s)](1 − s)
N−1
−2(N +1 ) A
0(s)ln(1− s)+
(N +1 ) A(s)
1 − s
.
30The two ﬁrst lines of this expression and the ﬁrst term on the third line are
negative for all s ∈ (0,1). The last term on the third line vanishes for N =1
and is negative for all s ∈ (0,1) and N>1.T h u s ,C00(s) < 0 for all s ∈ (0,1).
This, along with C0(0) = C(0) = 0,i m p l i e sC(s) < 0 for all s>0. q ∈ (0,1) by
assumption, hence C(q) < 0 and the result follows.
For δθ ≤ 2(1 − δ)K, qnr =0for all N ≥ 1.F o r δθ ∈ (2(1 − δ)K,2K),
δθ < (N +1 ) K and thus qnr ∈ (0,1) for all N ≥ 1, hence the result follows
directly from lemma A.1. For δθ ≥ 2K, qnr =1for all N ∈ [1,(δθ − K)/K],a n d
qnr ∈ (0,1) for all N>(δθ − K)/K. Hence, qnr is non-increasing in N even in
this case, which completes the proof.
A.4. Proof of proposition 3.4












= θ + z
nrδV
Inr +( 1− z
nr)[p
nrδV
Inr +( 1− p
nr)δV
Onr − K].
Substitute (3.3) for V Onr, (3.4) for V Inr, letting q = qnr and x =0 ,i n t ot h et w o
expressions above and simplify to obtain
x =
[1 − δ(1 − 2pnrqnr)](θ + znrK)+( 1− qnr)[1 − δ +2 δ(1 − znr)(1 − pnr)]K







δ(1 − pnr)θ +( 1− δ(1 − qnr))K
1 − δ(pnr(1 − qnr)+( 1− pnr)znr)
1 − znr
N
.( A . 1 0 )
In the proof of this proposition and the next we utilise the following lemma:
Lemma A.2. (i) x − x is strictly decreasing in N;( ii) lim
N→∞
(x − x) < 0.
Proof. Part (i): There are two cases to consider: (a) qnr ∈ (0,1);( b) qnr =1 .
Case (a): From part (iii) of proposition 3.1 qnr is implicitly given by the
solution to (3.6), which can be rewritten as K = δpnrθ/(1−δznr). Substitute this





1 − δznr.( A . 1 1 )














It is negative since dznr/dN > 0 (see lemma A.1). Rewrite (3.6) as θ =( 1−





pnr .( A . 1 2 )











xN > 0 by dznr/dN > 0 and dpnr = −(K/θ)dznr(see (??)). xN < 0 and xN > 0
imply x − x strictly decreasing in N for qnr ∈ (0,1).
Case (b): Set qnr =1and znr =0in (A.10) respective (A.9) and use pnr =



















Subtracting x from x yields:










This diﬀerence is clearly decreasing in N, which establishes the result.
Part (ii)F o rN large qnr ∈ (0,1) since δθ < (N +1)K for N large (see (iii)o f
proposition 3.1). N large, qnr ∈ (0,1) and part (iv) of lemma 2.1 imply pnr < 1/2
and thus x > 0 by (A.12). This, and xN > 0 imply that x is bounded away from





for all N suﬃciently large.
Thus, lim
N→∞
x =0 ,w h i c ha l o n gw i t hx bounded away from zero for all N suﬃciently
large, completes the proof.
Suppose N =1and θ/K > 2(1 + δ)/δ(1 − δ). This implies δθ > 2K(1 +
δ)/(1−δ) > 2K =2 ( N +1), hence qnr =1by part (ii) of proposition 3.1. Insert



















] < 0.( A . 1 3 )
x − x < 0 for N =1combined with part (i) of lemma A.2 yields the result.
A.5. Proof of proposition 3.5
Suppose N =1and θ/K ∈ [2/δ,2(1+δ)/δ(1−δ)). For all θ/K in this range we still
have znr =0 , qnr =1and pnr =1 /2, but now x−x > 0 from (A.13). Suppose next
N =1 ,b u tθ/K ∈ (2(1−δ)/δ,2/δ).F o ra l lθ/K in this range we have qnr ∈ (0,1).
Now x =0 ,s i n c epnr =1 /2 and x is given by (A.12). x>0 for all qnr > 0 by
(A.11). Hence, x − x > 0 for N =1for all θ/K ∈ (2(1 − δ)/δ,2(1 + δ)/δ(1 − δ)).
This, combined with lemma A.2, implies the existence of a unique N>1 such
that x − x ≥ 0 if and only if N ≤ N.
33